10 March 2008
Australia’s Minister for Defence,
Joel Fitzgibbon, has commissioned Parliamentary Secretary
for Defence procurement, Greg Combet, to oversee
an ongoing, annual review of Defence’s Top
30 acquisition projects by the Australian National
Audit Office.
In the 2007-08 financial year Australia’s
defence budget is $22 billion, of which some $9.6
billion will be spent on acquiring, upgrading and
sustaining defence equipment. Before it was elected,
the incoming Labor government pledged an immediate
audit of the Department of Defence, its budget and
management processes as well as instituting annual
reviews of major defence procurement projects.
Australia’s defence acquisition
processes were overhauled in 2003 following a review
of the government’s Canberra-based defence
procurement agency, the Defence Materiel Organisation
(DMO), headed by Adelaide industrialist Malcolm Kinnaird.
The Kinnaird Review recommended wide-ranging
improvements to the processes the department should
follow in specifying and procuring defence equipment.
Before winning office Fitzgibbon was highly critical
of the previous Howard government for its failure
to follow these new processes and charged it with
accepting defence project delays and budget blow-outs
as the norm rather than the exception.
Since taking office he has singled
out repeatedly in media interviews several major
procurement programs which have encountered serious
difficulties and delays: among them, the $1.4 billion
upgrade of four RAN FFG-7 frigates by prime contractor
Thales Australia, which is running four years late;
the 3.5 billion Australian dollar program to acquire
six Wedgetail Airborne Early Warning & Control
(AEW&C) aircraft from Boeing, which is now over
two years behind schedule; and the $950 million purchase
of 11 SH-2G(A) Super Seasprite helicopters for the
RAN, which Fitzgibbon finally terminated on March
5.
“The former government was obviously
aware of these issues and attempted to hide them
from the broader community,” he told Rumour
Control. “Worse still is the fact the former
government had no coherent plan for dealing with
any of these issues."
Also, Fitzgibbon has criticised heavily
the Howard government’s decision in 2007 to
order 24 F/A-18F Super Hornets at very short notice
under a U.S. Foreign Military Sales (FMS) arrangement,
at a cost of some $6.5 billion – this price
is the estimated whole of life, whole of capability
cost of the aircraft, incuding fuel, weapons and
training.
This election-year decision ignored
the Kinnaird processes, said Fitzgibbon, and was
taken “without justifying the need or undertaking
any comparative analysis or consideration of other
aircraft”.
Fitzgibbon said he would discuss these
and other so-called “high-risk” defence
projects with senior officials from the Australian
Defence Force, the DMO and the department before
presenting a recommended course of action to his
cabinet colleagues.
The planned review would implement
an election pledge by Fitzgibbon to carry out a full
audit of Australia’s defence budget “as
a matter of priority” to determine its true
position. He also will audit the effectiveness of
the DMO and implement greater Parliamentary oversight
of major defence acquisition projects.
The oversight role will be filled by
Parliamentary Secretary for Defence Procurement Greg
Combet. According to sources close to Combet his
long term goal will be to improve management and
administration within the DMO over the long term,
rather than a crash program to re-build the 2008
DCP. Part of the oversight process will be an annual,
independent review of Australia’s 30 biggest
defence procurement projects by the ANAO.
At the time of writing no formal announcements
had been made and DMO chief, Dr Steve Gumley, was
understood to be still deep in discussion with the
ANAO over how the projects will be selected and examined
by the auditors.
Notwithstanding Fitzgibbon and Combat’s
oft-stated concern to prevent a significant hiatus
in defence contracting as a result of these reviews,
industry is worried the review process could result
in the delay or cancellation of projects to which
Australian companies, especially small to medium
enterprises (SMEs), have already made a significant
financial commitment.
“Until you know what it is he
[Fitzgibbon] is targeting, it’s hard to know
what the implications are for Australian industry,” according
to Paul Fisher, Canberra-based director of the Defence
Industry Unit of Australian Business Ltd, one of
Australia’s major industry associations.
The Australian Department of Defence
is supposed to publish the latest update of its 10-year
Defence capability Plan (DCP) in mid-2008; this rolling,
$50 billion procurement blueprint is updated every
two years and the 2008 edition is scheduled to contain
additional industry policy implementation data derived
from the March 2007 Defence Industry Policy Statement.
However, the development of a new Defence
White Paper, which is due to be published at the
end of this year, is likely to impact on the scope
and timing of the new DCP. This, in turn, may not
now be published until early in 2009.
Combet himself provided no clues on
the timing of the next DCP in his keynote speech
to the ADM 2008 Congress in Canberra on 26 February.
But he did provide an important insight into his
priorities, his methods and his style.
He said: “As the Parliamentary
Secretary in this area I am formally responsible
to the Minister for Defence for the following areas:
- The Defence Materiel Organisation;
- The efficiency and effectiveness
of major capital equipment acquisition;
- Detailed analysis of and advice
to the Minister on acquisition and sustainment
issues generally;
- Contracting matters;
- Defence industry policy and maximising
Australian industry involvement;
- Defence exports, and
- A number of programs run through
DMO including the Skilling Australia Defence Industry
(SADI) Program.
“All of this fits within the
wider strategic objective to deliver to the ADF the
capability it needs, while at the same time delivering
value for money for taxpayers. In order to fulfil
my roles I have developed a work program in my office
comprising five keys categories:
- Significant projects which
are over budget and/or schedule
- Current projects
- Future procurement and sustainment
projects
- Ongoing reform of DMO
- Enhancement of Australian industry
capability
“The first of these is the monitoring
of projects that are suffering from slippages in
schedule and/or cost. I am sure many of you here
today will be aware of some projects that would fall
into this category.
“I am conducting, in conjunction
with the DMO, a review of these projects and providing
advice to the Minister for Defence on the best way
forward. Top of my list for this review process are
the Seasprite Helicopters. These helicopters are
already six years late and there are still a number
of issues that need to be worked through.
“There are also a number of other
projects suffering from similar problems. Basically
my job here, and it is an early priority of my work,
is to get across the detail of the projects so that
I can provide advice to the Minister for Defence,
who is the ultimate decision maker in these areas.
“I have seen some fairly radical
reporting of some of these projects within the media
and today I just wanted to inject a bit of realism
into the public debate surrounding them.
“Firstly, it is important to
note that these are generally what we call legacy
projects. By this I mean that are projects that predate
important Kinnaird reforms that have been made within
the procurement process. For example, after the commencement
of many of these projects we have seen the implementation
of improved cost and schedule estimation, a reduction
in ‘scope creep’ and the introduction
of the two-pass system of Government approvals. These
reforms have clearly made enormous progress in the
efficiency and professionalism of procurement decisions
and management.
“Secondly, a lot of the projects
where there are problems are also developmental and
involve some leading edge technology. Military forces
and many corporations worldwide have been challenged
by the high technical risk and cost/schedule uncertainty
associated with such projects.
“This of course is not to say
that I believe the performance of some of these projects
should be excused. They should not be. I am however
keen to inject some reality into the some of the
media reporting on these projects and some perspective
to the DMO’s performance.
“The fact is that DMO delivers
the vast majority of its programs on budget and on
time. I think sometimes DMO receives a lot of negative
media attention when something happens that is not
to plan, but little attention for projects it has
successfully pursued and implemented.
“In many of these problematic
acquisitions the Government is faced with complex
legal and commercial arrangements that bind the Commonwealth
and limit our options, but we are considering the
issues.
“We also are dealing with many
projects that remain critical to the ADF’s
future war-fighting ability.
“Therefore I want to moderate
some of the more fevered media speculation that the
Government will be cutting a large number of projects.
I noted with some interest a report in the Sun Herald
in NSW just last Sunday, the 24 February, in which
it was speculated that the following projects would
be cut:
- Super Hornets
- Abrams Tanks
- Air Warfare Destroyers
- Amphibious Ships
- Seasprite
- FFG Adelaide Class Frigates
- JSF
“And a host of others were all
subject to speculation that the Government was going
to chop the lot. And I want to state clearly to you
this is not the case. And please take that message.
We will be reviewing these things where there are
issues of concerns, but in many of the projects I
have just identified there are no immediate issues
of concern.
“With projects of the size and
importance that we are talking about the Rudd Government
is keen to make sure we are engaged and provide the
necessary direction and support.
“That is why the Prime Minister
and the Minister for Defence felt it was wise to
have, for the first time, a Parliamentary Secretary
who was tasked with the issue of Defence Procurement.
I certainly know that the Minister for Defence is
very committed to ensuring this area is handled professionally
and I am keen to provide him the necessary advice
and support he needs for this task.
“I believe it is also important
that we not only work towards a resolution of some
of the problem projects but also learn from some
of the mistakes of the past. From my examination
of these projects so far I can say that much of the
delays and cost pressures are due to the following
factors:
- The technically challenging
nature of the capability being sought;
- Incorrect or inadequate cost/schedule
forecasts;
- Failure to deliver against agreed
schedules by both domestic and foreign contractors;
- Increases in the cost of labour
and materials;
- Delays in project approval or contract
formation;
- Variations to scope, or
- Delay in platform upgrades due
to the heightened ADF operational tempo.
“Therefore it is part of my role
to devise reforms to the procurement process to ensure,
where possible, that we avoid making the same errors
in the future and much of that work has been done
due to the reforms already enacted.
“Another lesson that I have learnt,
and which now seems obvious, is that it is incredibly
difficult to integrate very modern military systems
into old and dated platforms. This is something that
the Government will be considering when we approach
our future procurement projects.”
“My fourth task… is to
continue the reform process within the DMO. One of
the key elements I see in any future reform program
is the current CEO of DMO, Dr Stephen Gumley. In
my short time as Parliamentary Secretary I have already
grown to greatly admire his talent, capacity and
the contribution he has made. Therefore I will be
keen for him to play a central role in a future program
of reforms.
ENDS
BREAKOUT BOX:
Labor’s Defence Policy:
what has Fitzgibbon promised?
The spate of reviews set up by new
defence minister Joel Fitzgibbon appear to be a determined
implementation of Labor’s 2007 election promises.
Pundits trying to predict Fitzgibbon’s next
course of action, and the drivers behind it, would
be well-advised to re-read Labour’s 2007 Defence
Policy, especially the section relating to defence
acquisition.
It states: “A Rudd Labor Government
will ensure its new Defence White Paper returns discipline
and strategic coherence to the Defence Capability
Plan (DCP).
“The Howard Government has politicised
and compromised the integrity of the DCP by consistently
ignoring its strategic basis. The Howard Government’s
failure to have in place the operational priorities,
framework and discipline that an up-to-date Defence
White Paper brings to long-term capability development
and planning has led to an unaffordable and incoherent
DCP.
“The ADF is also suffering because
of the Howard Government's failure to effectively
manage the DCP. The Howard Government’s mismanagement
of equipment projects worth hundreds of millions
of dollars has resulted in important capabilities
being delayed or abandoned.
“Efficiency in defence is not
just a matter of fiscal prudence and good housekeeping – it
is a matter of strategic necessity.
“The Howard Government has failed
to plan for the ongoing personnel and operating costs
generated by new equipment to such an extent that
the predicted shortfall calls into question the sustainability
of the Defence budget.
“A Rudd Labor Government will
conduct a full audit of the Defence budget to determine
the true position as a matter of priority. Labor
is committed to maintaining defence spending, including
a minimum annual 3 per cent real growth until 2016,
and is committed to ensuring that Defence dollars
are spent more effectively and efficiently.
“Labor will implement a number
of initiatives, and act upon their findings to address
shortcomings in the Defence organisation. These will
include:
- A comprehensive audit of
Defence financial management to ensure that the
corporate performance of the organisation fully
complies with the Financial Management and Accountability
Act 1997 and meets best practice standards;
- A formal evaluation of the effectiveness
of the reforms to the Defence Materiel Organisation
(DMO) that were implemented following the 2003
Review of Defence Procurement;
- Greater and more effective Parliamentary
oversight of the major defence acquisition program.
“Labor will also task and
resource the Australian National Audit Office to
undertake independent evaluations of the top 30
major defence equipment projects on an annual basis.”
© Rumour Control 2008
ENDS
|